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 
Abstract— The significance of the DDoS problem and the 
increased occurrence, sophistication and strength of attacks has 
led to the dawn of numerous prevention mechanisms. Each 
proposed prevention mechanism has some unique advantages 
and disadvantages over the others. In this paper, we present a 
classification of available mechanisms that are proposed in 
literature on preventing Internet services from possible DDoS 
attacks and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each 
mechanism. This provides better understanding of the problem 
and enables a security administrator to effectively equip his 
arsenal with proper prevention mechanisms for fighting against 
DDoS threat. 
 
Index Terms— DoS, DDoS, Network Security, Prevention.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 A revolution came into the world of computer and 
communication with the advent of Internet. Today, Internet 
has become increasingly important to current society. It is 
changing our way of communication, business mode, and even 
everyday life [1]. Almost all the traditional services such as 
banking, power, medicine, education and defense are 
extended to Internet now. The impact of Internet on society 
can be seen from the fig. 1 which shows exponential increase 
in number of hosts interconnected through Internet [2]. 
Internet usage is growing at an exponential rate as 
organizations, governments and citizens continue to increase 
their reliance on this technology.  
 
Fig. 1 Internet Domain Survey Host Count 
Unfortunately with an increase in number of host, count of 
attacks on Internet has also increased incredibly fast. 
According to [3], a mere 171 vulnerabilities were reported in 
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1995, which boomed to 7236 in 2007. Already, the number for 
the same for merely the third quarter of 2008 has gone up to 
6058. Apart from these, a large number of vulnerabilities go 
unreported every year. In particular, today DoS attack is one of 
the most common and major threat to the Internet. In DoS 
attack, goal of the attacker is to tie up chosen key resources at 
the victim, usually by sending a high volume of seemingly 
legitimate traffic requesting some services from the victim. It 
reveals big loopholes not only in specific applications, but 
also in the entire TCP/IP protocol suite. DoS attack is 
considered to take place only when access to a computer or 
network resource is intentionally blocked or degraded as a 
result of malicious action taken by another user [4]. 
A DDoS attacker uses many machines to launch a 
coordinated DOS attack against one or more targets [5]. It is 
launched indirectly through many compromised computing 
systems by sending a stream of useless aggregate traffic meant 
to explode victim resources. As a side effect, they frequently 
create network congestion on the way  from  a  source  to  the  
target,  thus  disrupting  normal  Internet  operation. The 
number of DDoS attack has been alarmingly increasing for the 
last few years [6]. Many of today’s DDoS attacks are carried 
out by organized criminals targeting financial institutions, 
e-commerce, gambling sites etc [7]. 
A classification of a wide range of DDoS attacks found in 
the wild is presented in [4, 8] that Internet providers and users 
need to be aware of. Usually, it can be launched in two forms 
[9]. The first form is to exploit software vulnerabilities of a 
target by sending malformed packets and crash the system. The 
second form is to use massive volumes of legitimate looking 
but garbled packets to clogs up computational or 
communication resources on the target machine so that it 
cannot serve its legitimates users. The resources consumed by 
attacks include network bandwidth, disk space, CPU time, 
data structures, network connections, etc. While it is possible 
to protect the first form of attack by patching known 
vulnerabilities, the second form of attack cannot be so easily 
prevented. The targets can be attacked simply because they are 
connected to the public Internet.  
The first publicly reported DDoS attacks appeared in the 
late 1999 against a university [10]. These attacks quickly 
became increasingly popular as communities of crackers 
developed and released extremely sophisticated, user friendly 
and automated toolkits [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] to 
carry them out. At present, even people with little knowledge 
can use them to carry out DDoS attacks. The impact of DoS 
attacks can vary from minor inconvenience to users of a 
website, to serious financial losses for companies that rely on 
their on-line availability to do business.  
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This paper presents overview of DDoS problem, available 
DDoS attack tools, defense challenges and principles and a 
classification of available mechanisms that are proposed in 
literature on preventing Internet services from possible DDoS 
attacks and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each 
mechanism. A summery of pending concerns draw attention to 
core problems in existing mechanisms.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
II contains overview of DDoS problem. Section III describes 
variety of available DDoS attack tools in the details. Section 
IV discusses defense challenges and principles. Classification 
of available DDoS prevention mechanisms is described in 
section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and 
presents further research scope.  
 
II. DDOS OVERVIEW 
A Distributed Denial of Service attack is commonly 
characterized as an event in which a legitimate user or 
organization is deprived of certain services, like web, email or 
network connectivity, that they would normally expect to have. 
DDoS is basically a resource overloading problem. The 
resource can be bandwidth, memory, CPU cycles, file 
descriptors, buffers etc. The attackers bombard scare resource 
either by flood of packets or a single logic packet which can 
activate a series of processes to exhaust the limited resource 
[20]. In the Fig. 2 simplified Distributed DoS attack scenario 
is illustrated. The figure shows that attacker uses three 
zombie’s to generate high volume of malicious traffic to flood 
the victim over the Internet thus rendering legitimate user 
unable to access the service. 
 
Internet
Legitimate User
Victim
Router
Machine's Controlled by attacker
A1 A2 A3
 
Fig. 2 Illustration of the DDoS attack scenario 
 
Extremely sophisticated, user friendly, automated and 
powerful DDoS toolkits are available for attacking any victim, 
so expertise is not necessarily required that attract naive users 
to perform DDoS attacks. 
 Although DoS attacking strategies differ in time, studies 
show that attackers mainly target the following resources to 
cause damage on victim [8, 21]. 
Network bandwidth resources: This is related with the 
capacity of the network links connecting servers to the wider 
Internet or connectivity between the clients and their Internet 
Service Providers (ISP). Most of the time, the bandwidth of 
client’s internal network is less than its connectivity with the 
external network. Thus the traffic that comes from the Internet 
to the client may consume the entire bandwidth of the client’s 
network. As a result, a legitimate request will not be able to get 
service from the targeted network. In a DoS attack, the vast 
majority of traffic directed at the target network is malicious; 
generated either directly or indirectly by an attacker. These 
attacks prevented 13,000 Bank of America ATM from 
providing withdrawn services and paralyzed such large ISPs as 
Freetel, SK Telecom, and KoreaTelecom on January 25, 2003.  
1) System memory resources: An attack targeting system 
memory resources typically aims to crash its network 
handling software rather than consuming bandwidth with 
large volume of traffic. Specific packets are sent to 
confuse the operating system or other resources of the 
victim’s machine. These include temporary buffer used to 
store arriving packets, tables of open connections, and 
similar memory data structures. Another system resource 
attack uses packets whose structures trigger a bug in the 
network software, overloading the target machine or 
disabling its communication mechanism or making a host 
crash, freeze or reboot which means the system can no 
longer communicate over the network until the software is 
reloaded.  
2) System CPU resources/ Computational Capacity: An 
attack targeting system’s CPU resources typically aims to 
employ a sequence of queries to execute complex 
commands and then overwhelmed the CPU.  The Internet 
key Exchange protocol (IKE) is the current IETF standard 
for key establishment and SA parameter negotiation of 
IPsec. However, IKE’s aggregate mode is still very 
susceptible to DoS attacks against both computational 
and memory resources because the server has to create 
states for SA and compute Diffie-Hellman exponential 
generation [22].  
 
III. DDOS ATTACKS TOOLS 
One of the major reason that make the DDoS attacks wide 
spread and easy in the Internet is the availability of attacking 
tools and the powerfulness of these tools to generate attacking 
traffic. There are a variety of different DDoS attack tools on 
the Internet that allow attackers to execute attacks on the target 
system. Some of the most common tools are discussed below: 
1) Trinoo [8, 11] can be used to launch a coordinated UDP 
flooding attack against target system. Trinoo deploys 
master/slave architecture and attacker controls a number 
of Trinoo master machines. Communication between 
attacker and master and between master and slave is 
performed through TCP and UDP protocol, respectively. 
Both master and slaves are password protected to prevent 
them from being taken over by another attacker. 
Wintrinoo  
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DDoS 
attack tool 
Commands used Types of 
Attacks 
Generated 
Communication Methods 
Trinoo Not encrypted UDP flooding Attacker to master-unencrypted TCP 
Master to slave- unencrypted UDP 
Slave  to  master  - unencrypted UDP 
TFN Numeric code and 
not encrypted 
ICMP 
flooding 
TCP flooding 
UDP flooding 
Smurf 
Attacker to master -required third-party 
program  
Master  to slave- unencrypted ICMP 
Slave to master - none 
TFN2K Encrypted ICMP 
flooding 
TCP flooding 
UDP flooding 
Smurf  
Mix flood 
Master to slave- can be mixture of 
encrypted TCP, UDP and ICMP 
Slave to  master  - none 
Stacheldraht Encrypted ICMP 
flooding 
TCP flooding 
UDP flooding 
Smurf 
Attacker to  master -encrypted TCP 
Master  to slave- TCP and ICMP 
Slave  to  master - none 
Shaft Not encrypted ICMP 
flooding 
TCP flooding 
UDP flooding 
Mix flood 
Attacker to  master -unencrypted TCP 
Master to slave- unencrypted UDP 
Mstream Not encrypted TCP flooding Attacker to  master -unencrypted TCP 
Master to slave- unencrypted UDP 
Slave to  master - unencrypted UDP 
Knight Not encrypted TCP flooding  
UDP Flooding  
an urgent 
pointer 
flooder 
Uses IRC as it’s communication method 
Trinity Not encrypted TCP flooding 
UDP flooding 
Uses IRC as it’s communication method 
Table I Summery of DDoS attack Tools 
is a Windows version of trinoo that was first reported to 
CERT on February 16th 2000.  
2) TFN [12] uses a command line interface to communicate 
between the attacker and the control master program but 
offers no encryption between attacker and masters or 
between masters and slaves. Communication between the 
control masters and slaves is done via ICMP echo reply 
packets. It can implement Smurf, SYN Flood, UDP Flood, 
and ICMP Flood attacks.  
3) TFN2K [13] is a more advanced version of the primitive 
TFN network. It uses TCP, UDP, ICMP or all three to 
communicate between the control master program and the 
slave machines. TFN2K can implement Smurf, SYN, 
UDP, and ICMP Flood attacks. Communication between 
the real attacker and control master is encrypted using a 
key-based CAST-256 algorithm. In addition to flooding, 
TFN2K can also perform some vulnerability attacks by 
sending malformed or invalid packets. 
4) Stacheldraht [14] combines best features of both Trinoo 
and TFN. It also has the ability to perform updates on the 
slave machines automatically. It uses an encrypted TCP 
connection for communication between the attacker and 
master control program. Communication between the 
master control program and attack daemons is conducted 
using TCP and ICMP. Stacheldraht can implement Smurf, 
SYN Flood, UDP Flood, and ICMP Flood attacks.  
5) Shaft [15] has been modeled on Trinoo network. Other 
than the port numbers being used for communication 
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purpose, working of it is very similar to the Trinoo. Thus, 
distinctive feature of Shaft is the ability to switch control 
master servers and ports in real time, hence making 
detection by intrusion detection tools difficult. 
Communication between the control masters and slave 
machines is achieved using UDP packets. The control 
masters and the attacker communicate via a simple TCP 
telnet connection.  Shaft can implement UDP, ICMP, and 
TCP flooding attack.  
6) Mstream [16] is more primitive than any of the other 
DDoS tools. It attacks target machine with a TCP ACK 
flood. Communication is not encrypted and is performed 
through TCP and UDP packets and the master connects 
via telnet to zombie. Masters can be controlled remotely 
by one or more attackers using a password protected 
interactive login. Source addresses in attack packets are 
spoofed at random. Unlike other DDoS tools, here, 
masters are informed of access, successful or not, by 
competing parties.  
7) Knight [17] uses IRC as a control channel. It has been 
reported that the tool is commonly being installed on 
machines that were previously compromised by the 
BackOrifice Trojan horse program. Knight can implement 
SYN attacks, UDP Flood attacks, and an urgent pointer 
flooder [19]. It is designed to run on Windows operating 
systems and has features such as an automatic updater via 
http or ftp, a checksum generator and more. 
8) Trinity [18, 19] is also IRC based DDoS attack tool. It can 
implement UDP, IP fragment, TCP SYN, TCP RST, TCP 
ACK, and other flooding attacks. Each trinity 
compromise machine joins a specified IRC channel and 
waits for commands. Use of legitimate IRC service for 
communication between attacker and agents eliminates 
the need for a master machine and elevates the level of the 
threat [4].  
 
Table I shows a summary of different attack tools properties. 
Source code of these attack tools can be easily downloaded 
from the Internet. Even though these attack tools differ in the 
commands used, types of attacks used, communication 
techniques, and the presence of backdoors or self-upgrade 
capability, all share the common object of attempting to 
overwhelm a victim with an abundant amount of traffic that is 
difficult to detect or filter.  
IV. DEFENSE CHALLENGES AND PRINCIPLES 
Launching DDoS attacks on the victim machine is only a 
matter of few keystrokes for the attacker. The victim can 
prevent from these attacks at its network boundary by 
configuring some sort of traditional security tools like access 
list [23], firewall [24, 25], or intrusion detection system [26, 
27] at its end. But the regular benign traffic to the victim’s 
network is not protected and moreover the victim cannot have 
access to other networks (e.g. the Internet). 
With the present technology, many challenges are involved 
in designing and implementing an effective DDoS defense 
mechanism. Some of them are as follows [28]: 
(a) Large number of unwitting participants, (b) No common 
characteristics of DDoS streams, (c) Use of legitimate traffic 
models by attackers, (d) No administrative domain 
cooperation, (e) Automated tools, (f)  Hidden identity of 
participants, (g) Persistent security holes on the Internet, (h) 
Lack of attack information and (i) Absence of standardized 
evaluation and testing approaches. 
Thus following five principles [29] are recommended by 
robinson et al. in order to build an effective solution: 
9) Since, DDoS is a distributed attack and because of high 
volume and rate of attack packets, distributed instead of 
centralized defense is the first principle of DDoS defense.  
10) Secondly, High Normal Packet Survival Ratio (NPSR) 
hence less collateral damage is the prime requirement for 
a DDoS defense. 
11) Third, a DDoS defense method should provide secure 
communication for control messages in terms of 
confidentiality, authentication of sources, integrity and 
freshness of exchanged messages between defense nodes.  
12) Fourth, as there is no centralized control for autonomous 
systems (AS) in Internet, a partially and incrementally 
deployable defense model which does not need 
centralized control will be successful. 
13) Fifth, a defense system must take into account future 
compatibility issues such as interfacing with other 
systems and negotiating different defense policies.  
Similarly, Tupakula et. al. [30] presented following 
characteristics that an ideal effective model against DDoS 
attacks should have: 
14) It should be invoked only during the attack times and at 
other times it must allow the system to work normally. So 
it should readily integrate with existing architecture with 
minimum modifications. 
15) It must provide simple, easy and effective solution to 
counteract the attacking sources in preventing the attack. 
16) It should identify the attack at the victim and prevent the 
attack near to the attacking source. 
17) It should prevent only the attack traffic from reaching 
victim. That is, the model should be able to differentiate a 
malicious traffic flow from a regular benign flow by 
incorporating different attack signatures for different 
attacking sources. 
18) It should have fast response time and should respond 
quickly to any changes in attack traffic pattern. 
19) It should provide mechanisms for retaining the attack 
evidence for any future legal proceedings. 
V. CLASSIFICATION OF DDOS PREVENTION MECHANISMS 
Attack prevention methods try to stop all well known 
signature based and broadcast based DDoS attacks from being 
launched in the first place or edge routers, keeps all the 
machines over Internet up to date with patches and fix security 
holes. Attack prevention schemes are not enough to stop 
DDoS attacks because there are always vulnerable to novel 
and mixed attack types for which signatures and patches are 
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not exist in the database.  
Techniques for preventing against DDoS can be broadly 
divided into two categories: (i) General techniques, which are 
some common preventive measures [31] i.e. system protection, 
replication of resources etc. that individual servers and ISPs 
should follow so they do not become part of DDoS attack 
process. (iii) Filtering techniques, which include ingress 
filtering, egress filtering, router based packet filtering, history 
based IP filtering, SAVE protocol etc. 
A. General Techniques 
1) Disabling unused services 
The less there are applications and open ports in hosts, the 
less there are chance to exploit vulnerabilities by attackers. 
Therefore, if network services are not needed or unused, the 
services should be disabled to prevent attacks, e.g. UDP echo, 
character generation services [31]. 
2) Install latest security patches 
Today, many DDoS attacks exploit vulnerabilities in target 
system. So removing known security holes by installing all 
relevant latest security patches prevents re-exploitation of 
vulnerabilities in the target system [31]. 
3) Disabling IP broadcast 
Defense against attacks that use intermediate broadcasting 
nodes e.g. ICMP flood attacks, Smurf attacks etc. will be 
successful only if host computers and all the neighboring 
networks disable IP broadcast [32]. 
4) Firewalls 
Firewalls can effectively prevent users from launching 
simple flooding type attacks from machines behind the 
firewall. Firewalls have simple rules such as to allow or deny 
protocols, ports or IP addresses. But some complex attack e.g. 
if there is an attack on port 80 (web service), firewalls cannot 
prevent that attack because they cannot distinguish good 
traffic from DoS attack traffic [24, 25].  
5) Global defense infrastructure 
A global deployable defense infrastructure can prevent from 
many DDoS attacks by installing filtering rules in the most 
important routers of the Internet. As Internet is administered 
by various autonomous systems according their own local 
security policies, such type of global defense architecture is 
possible only in theory [31]. 
6) IP hopping 
DDoS attacks can be prevented by changing location or IP 
address of the active server proactively within a pool of 
homogeneous servers or with a pre-specified set of IP address 
ranges [31]. The victim computer’s IP address is invalidated by 
changing it with a new one. Once the IP addresses change is 
completed all internet routers will be informed and edge 
routers will drop the attacking packets. Although this action 
leaves the computer vulnerable because the attacker can 
launch the attack at the new IP address, this option is practical 
for DDoS attacks that are based on IP addresses. On the other 
hand, attackers can make this technique useless by adding a 
domain name service tracing function to the DDoS attack 
tools. 
B. Filtering Techniques 
1) Ingress/Egress filtering 
Ingress Filtering, proposed by Ferguson et al. [33], is a 
restrictive mechanism to drop traffic with IP addresses that do 
not match a domain prefix connected to the ingress router. 
Egress filtering is an outbound filter, which ensures that only 
assigned or allocated IP address space leaves the network.  A 
key requirement for ingress or egress filtering is knowledge of 
the expected IP addresses at a particular port. For some 
networks with complicated topologies, it is not easy to obtain 
this knowledge. 
One technique known as reverse path filtering [34] can help 
to build this knowledge. This technique works as follows. 
Generally, a router always knows which networks are 
reachable via any of its interfaces. By looking up source 
addresses of the incoming traffic, it is possible to check 
whether the return path to that address would flow out the 
same interface as the packet arrived upon. If they do, these 
packets are allowed. Otherwise, they are dropped.  
Unfortunately, this technique cannot operate effectively in 
real networks where asymmetric Internet routes are not 
uncommon. More importantly, both ingress and egress 
filtering can be applied not only to IP addresses, but also 
protocol type, port number, or any other criteria of importance. 
Both ingress and egress filtering provide some opportunities 
to throttle the attack power of DoS attacks. However, it is 
difficult to deploy ingress/egress filtering universally. If the 
attacker carefully chooses a network without ingress/egress 
filtering to launch a spoofed DoS attack, the attack can go 
undetected. Moreover, if an attack spoofs IP addresses from 
within the subnet, the attack can go undetected as well. 
Nowadays DDoS attacks do not need to use source address 
spoofing to be effective. By exploiting a large number of 
compromised hosts, attackers do not need to use spoofing to 
take advantage of protocol vulnerabilities or to hide their 
locations. For example, each legitimate HTTP Web page 
request from 10,000 compromised hosts can bypass any 
ingress/egress filtering, but in combination they can constitute 
a powerful attack. Hence, ingress and egress filtering are 
ineffective to stop DDoS attacks. 
2) Router based packet filtering  
Route based filtering, proposed by Park and Lee [35], 
extends ingress filtering and uses the route information to 
filter out spoofed IP packets. It is based on the principle that 
for each link in the core of the Internet, there is only a limited 
set of source addresses from which traffic on the link could 
have originated. 
If an unexpected source address appears in an IP packet on 
a link, then it is assumed that the source address has been 
spoofed, and hence the packet can be filtered. RPF uses 
information about the BGP routing topology to filter traffic 
with spoofed source addresses. Simulation results show that a 
significant fraction of spoofed IP addresses can be filtered if 
RPF is implemented in at least 18% of ASs in the Internet.  
However, there are several limitations of this scheme. The first 
limitation relates to the implementation of RPF in practice. 
Given that the Internet contains more than 10,000 ASs, RPF 
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would need to be implemented in at least 1800 ASs in order to 
be effective, which is an onerous task to accomplish. The 
second limitation is that RPF may drop legitimate packets if 
there has recently been a route change. The third potential 
limitation is that RPF relies on valid BGP messages to 
configure the filter. If an attacker can hijack a BGP session 
and disseminate bogus BGP messages, then it is possible to 
mislead border routers to update filtering rules in favor of the 
attacker. RPF is effective against randomly spoofed DoS 
attacks. However, the filtering granularity of RPF is low. This 
means that the attack traffic can still bypass the RPF filters by 
carefully choosing the range of IP addresses to spoof. Hence, 
RPF is ineffective against DDoS attacks. The router-based 
packet filter is vulnerable to asymmetrical and dynamic 
Internet routing as it does not provide a scheme to update the 
routing information. 
3) History based IP filtering 
Generally, the set of source IP addresses that is seen during 
normal operation tends to remain stable. In contrast, during 
DoS attacks, most of the source IP addresses have not been 
seen before. Peng et al. relies on the above idea and use IP 
address database (IAD) to keep frequent source IP addresses. 
During an attack, if the source address of a packet is not in 
IAD, the packet is dropped.  Hash based/Bloom filter 
techniques are used for fast searching of IP in IAD. This 
scheme is robust, and does not need the cooperation of the 
whole Internet community [36].  
However, history based packet filtering scheme is 
ineffective when the attacks come from real IP addresses. In 
addition, it requires an offline database to keep track of IP 
addresses. Therefore, Cost of storage and information sharing 
is very high.  
4) Capability based method 
Capability based mechanisms provides destination a way to 
control the traffic directed towards itself. In this approach, 
source first sends request packets to its destination. Router 
marks (pre-capabilities) are added to request packet while 
passing through the router. The destination may or may not 
grant permission to the source to send. If permission is granted 
then destination returns the capabilities, if not then it does not 
supply the capabilities in the returned packet. The data 
packets carrying the capabilities are then send to the  
 
Table II Summary of filtering techniques for DDoS attacks prevention 
 
destination via router. The main advantage achieved in this 
architecture is that the destination can now control the traffic 
according to its own policy, thereby reducing the chances of 
DDoS attack, as packets without capabilities are treated as 
legacy and might get dropped at the router when congestion 
happens [37]. 
However, these systems offer strong protection for 
established network flows, but responsible to generate a new 
attack type known as DOC (Denial of Capability), which 
prevents new capability-setup packets from reaching the 
destination, limits the value of these systems. In addition, 
these systems have high computational complexity and space 
requirement. 
5) Secure overlay Service (SOS) 
Secure Overlay Service proposed by Keromytis et al. [38] 
defines an architecture called secure overlay service (SOS) to 
secure the communication between the confirmed users and 
the victim.  All the traffic from a source point is verified by a 
secure overlay access point (SOAP). Authenticated traffic will 
be routed to a special overlay node called a beacon in an 
anonymous manner by consistent hash mapping. The beacon 
then forwards traffic to another special overlay node called a 
Filtering Technique Benefits Limitations 
Ingress/ Egress -Prevents IP Spoofing -Need global development 
- Attacks with real IP addresses can not be prevented 
RPF ( Route based 
Packet Filtering) 
-Work well with static routing -Problem when dynamic routing is used 
-Need wide implementation to be effective 
History based  -Does not require cooperation of whole Internet 
Community. 
-Gives priority to the frequent packets in case of 
congestion or attack 
- Ineffective when the attacks come from real IP addresses 
- Requires an offline database to keep track of IP addresses 
-Depend on information collected 
Capability based -Provides destination a way to control the traffic it 
desires 
-Incremental deployment 
-Attacks against the request packets can not prevented (e.g. 
ROC attack) 
-High computational complexity and space requirement 
SOS -Works well for communication of predefined 
source nodes 
-Solution has limited scope e.g. not applicable to web servers 
-Require introduction of a new routing protocol that itself 
another security issue 
SAVE -Filtering improperly addressed packets is 
worthwhile 
-incremental deployment 
-During the transient period valid packets can be dropped 
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secret servlet for further authentication, and the secret servlet 
forwards verified traffic to the victim. The identity of the secret 
servlet is revealed to the beacon via a secure protocol, and 
remains a secret to the attacker. Finally, only traffic forwarded 
by the secret servlet chosen by the victim can pass its 
perimetric routers.  
Secure Overlay Service (SOS) addresses the problem of 
how to guarantee the communication between legitimate users 
and a victim during DoS attacks. SOS can greatly reduce the 
likelihood of a successful attack. The power of SOS is based 
on the number and distribution level of SOAPs. However, 
wide deployment of SOAPs is a difficult DoS defense 
challenge. Moreover, the power of SOS is also based on the 
anonymous routing protocol within the overlay nodes. 
Unfortunately, the introduction of a new routing protocol is in 
itself another security issue. If an attacker is able to breach the 
security protection of some overlay node, then it can launch 
the attack from inside the overlay network. Moreover, if 
attackers can gain massive attack power, for example, via 
worm spread, all the SOAPs can be paralyzed, and the target's 
services will be disrupted. 
6) SAVE: Source Address Validity Enforcement 
Li et al. [39] have proposed a new protocol called the 
Source Address Validity Enforcement (SAVE) protocol, 
which enables routers to update the information of expected 
source IP addresses on each link and block any IP packet with 
an unexpected source IP address. The aim of the SAVE 
protocol is to provide routers with information about the range 
of source IP addresses that should be expected at each 
interface. Similarly to the existing routing protocols, SAVE 
constantly propagates messages containing valid source 
address information from the source location to all 
destinations. Hence, each router along the way is able to build 
an incoming table that associates each link of the router with a 
set of valid source address blocks. SAVE is a protocol that 
enables the router to filter packets with spoofed source 
addresses using incoming tables. It overcomes the 
asymmetries of Internet routing by updating the incoming 
tables on each router periodically.  
However, SAVE needs to change the routing protocol, 
which will take a long time to accomplish. If SAVE is not 
universally deployed, attackers can always spoof the IP 
addresses within networks that do not implement SAVE. 
Moreover, even if SAVE were universally deployed, attackers 
could still launch DDoS attacks using non spoofed source 
addresses. 
Table II summarizes filtering techniques for DDoS attacks 
prevention. 
To conclude, attack prevention aims to solve IP spoofing, a 
fundamental weakness of the Internet. However, as attackers 
gain control of larger numbers of compromised computers, 
attackers can direct these “zombies” to attack using valid 
source addresses. Since the communication between attackers 
and “zombies” is encrypted, only “zombies” can be exposed 
instead of attackers. According to the Internet Architecture 
Working Group [40], the percentage of spoofed attacks is 
declining. Only four out of 1127 customer-impacting DDoS 
attacks on a large network used spoofed sources in 2004. 
Moreover, security awareness is still not enough, so expecting 
installation of security technologies and patches in large base 
of Internet seems to be an ambitious goal in near future. To add 
on, there exists no way out to enforce global deployment of a 
particular security mechanism. Therefore, relying on attack 
prevention schemes is not enough to stop DDoS attacks. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE SCOPE 
DoS attack causes either disruption or degradation on 
victim’s shared resources, as a result preventing legitimate 
users from their access right on those resources. DoS attack 
may target on a specific component of computer, entire 
computer system, certain networking infrastructure, or even 
entire Internet infrastructure. Attacks can be either by exploits 
the natural weakness of a system, which is known as logical 
attacks or overloading the victim with high volume of traffic, 
which is called flooding attacks. A distributed form of DoS 
attack called DDoS attack, which is generated by many 
compromised machines to coordinately hit a victim. DDoS 
attacks are adversarial and constantly evolving. Once a 
particular kind of attack is successfully countered, a slight 
variation is designed that bypasses the defense and still 
performs an effective attack. 
 In this paper, we covered an overview of the DDoS 
problem, available DDoS attack tools, defense challenges and 
principles, and a classification of available DDoS prevention 
mechanisms. This provides better understanding of the 
problem and enables a security administrator to effectively 
equip his arsenal with proper prevention mechanisms for 
fighting against DDoS threat. The current prevention 
mechanisms reviewed in this paper are clearly far from 
adequate to protect Internet from DDoS attack. The main 
problem is that there are still many insecure machines over the 
Internet that can be compromised to launch large-scale 
coordinated DDoS attack. One promising direction is to 
develop a comprehensive solution that encompasses several 
defense activities to trap variety of DDoS attack.  If one level 
of defense fails, the others still have the possibility to defend 
against attack. A successful intrusion requires all defense level 
to fail.  
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